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Wrongful Extradition: Reforming the
Committal Phase of Canada’s
Extradition Law
R O B E R T
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ABSTRACT
There has recently been an upswing in interest around extradition in
Canada, particularly in light of the high-profile and troubling case of
Hassan Diab who was extradited to France on the basis of what
turned out to be an ill-founded case. Diab’s case highlights some of
the problems with Canada’s Extradition Act and proceedings
thereunder. This paper argues that the “committal stage” of
extradition proceedings, involving a judicial hearing into the basis of
the requesting state’s case, is unfair and may not be compliant with
the Charter and that the manner in which the Crown conducts these
proceedings contributes to this unfairness. It also argues that
regardless of the Act’s constitutionality, in light of Diab and other
disturbing cases, the time is ripe for law reform to ensure that
*
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extradition proceedings are carried out in a way that is consistent with
Canadian public policy. Some suggestions for reform are made, as well as a
proposal for a serious Parliamentary effort.

Keywords: extradition; international law; Charter of Rights and Freedoms;
transnational crime; International Assistance Group; Crown law

I. INTRODUCTION

E

xtradition – the formal surrender of individuals between states in
order to facilitate criminal proceedings – is often thought of as an
obscure legal process, despite its reputedly ancient origins.1 This is no
less true in Canada where the relatively small number of extradition cases
are handled predominantly by lawyers in Justice Canada’s International
Assistance Group (IAG)2 and a smattering of defence lawyers across the
country, most of the latter of whom do not practice enough in the field to
develop any particular expertise. The Canadian legal literature on
extradition is not voluminous.
However, the veil of obscurity has been yanked open in the last several
years. Internationally, extradition has been front and centre, from a
proposed extradition law that sparked months of rioting and civil unrest in
Hong Kong3 to Julian Assange’s futile years-long attempt to avoid the British
extradition hearing under way at the time of writing (which may see him
extradited to face American wrath over the Wikileaks disclosures).4 For
Canada’s part, the arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou in December
2018 on an American extradition warrant has embroiled it in what is easily

1

2
3

4

Ivan Shearer, Extradition in International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1971) at 5.
See Section II.C, below.
“Hong Kong: Timeline of extradition protests”, BBC News (4 September 2019), online:
<www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49340717> [perma.cc/MD68-J5FZ]. See also
“Canada suspends extradition treaty with Hong Kong over new security law”, CBC News
(3 July 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-suspending-extradition-treatyhong-kong-over-security-law-1.5636479> [perma.cc/B7LG-R866] (Canada recently
“suspended” its extradition treaty with Hong Kong as a means of protesting the new
security law imposed upon it by China).
“Julian Assange appears in dock as extradition hearing resumes”, BBC News (7
September 2020), online: <www.bbc.com/news/uk-54060427> [perma.cc/P4UV-8D3
P].
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the most complex and daunting foreign policy dispute it has faced in
decades5 and put our extradition relations firmly on the public radar.
Even aside from the Meng case, however, Canada’s extradition laws
have increasingly come under scrutiny in the last several years by way of a
slowly-building groundswell of unease around the mechanics and
application of the 1999 Extradition Act.6 An early and prescient critique by
Professor Anne La Forest suggested that while the then-“new” Act was
certainly capable of achieving the Crown’s stated goals of making Canada’s
extradition process more efficient and easier to access by partner states, it
had also greatly reduced the role of the courts and focused too much power
and discretion in the hands of the executive (specifically, the Minister of
Justice).7 Over the course of two decades, and even in the face of (mostly
unsuccessful) constitutional challenges, this forecast has proven to be true,
and there have been growing calls for reform of the Extradition Act – a piece
of legislation that frequent extradition commentator Gary Botting has
called (perhaps hyperbolically) “the least fair law in Canada.”8
This unease came to a head during 2018–2019, during which time there
was intense public interest in the case of Dr. Hassan Diab. Diab, a Canadian
citizen of Lebanese descent, was extradited to France in 2014 to face
terrorism charges, only to be released more than three years later when (as
had been apparent during the Canadian extradition proceedings) the
French case against him was exposed as being without foundation. This
controversial case sparked calls for reform, which will be explored below.
More recently, a highly-criticized extradition case ended in the death of
the individual sought. The leading recent extradition decision by the
Supreme Court of Canada, MM v United States of America,9 dealt with an
extradition request by the U.S. for Michele Messina, a dual Canadian-U.S.
citizen who fled the state of Georgia with her children in 2010 for fear of
5

6
7

8

9

See Charles-Louis Labrecque, “Canada-China Relations Since Meng Wanzhou’s
Arrest” (3 December 2019), online: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada <www.asiapacific.c
a/publication/canada-china-relations-wanzhous-arrest> [perma.cc/7BHW-NX38].
Extradition Act, SC 1999, c 18 [Act].
Anne Warner La Forest, “The Balance Between Liberty and Comity in the Evidentiary
Requirements Applicable to Extradition Proceedings” (2002) 28:1 Queen’s LJ 95 (QL).
Elyse Skura, “Nunavut priest sex abuse case stirs up criticism of ‘least fair law in
Canada’”, CBC News (22 February 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/e
xtradition-france-canada-diab-rivoire-1.5028783> [perma.cc/LC2K-7AHZ].
MM v United States of America, 2015 SCC 62 [MM].
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her abusive husband.10 After she was arrested at a women’s shelter in
Quebec, she fought extradition for nine years. In its 2015 decision, a
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada upheld her surrender despite
clear evidence that had the conduct occurred in Canada, she would have a
defence of necessity available, but that the defence was not available in the
U.S. This, the Court ruled, was a matter for the foreign trial court. ThenJustice Minister Jody Wilson-Raybould agreed to re-consider the case but
eventually confirmed the surrender order, and the Supreme Court denied
leave to appeal on the confirmed order on October 17, 2019.11 Messina died
by suicide in prison three weeks later,12 bringing her case to a dramatic and
troubling close.
Extradition from Canada,13 as will be explained below, is a three-phase
process. This article will focus on the second “judicial” or “committal” phase
and argue that Canada’s law and procedures are in need of significant
reform. Changes are required, not because extradition itself is somehow
illegitimate, but because our extradition machinery has a number of
problematic features that produce unfairness, both systemically and in
individual cases.
The rest of this paper will proceed in five parts. Part II will give an
overview of the Diab case and explain how it, in particular, has provided
impetus for reform efforts. Part III provides a brief overview of extradition
law and procedure in Canada to set the backdrop for the reform proposals.
Part IV will critique the law and procedure that underpin the committal
phase and offer suggestions for change, while Part V will give similar
treatment to the manner in which the Crown’s role in extradition is
conceived and executed. Reference to specific cases, particularly Diab and
10

11

12

13

Some background about the case can be found in Matthew Behrens, “Canada’s
extradition law a dangerous back-door bludgeon for abusive ex-spouses” (14 December
2018), online: rabble.ca <rabble.ca/columnists/2018/12/canadas-extradition-law-dange
rous-back-door-bludgeon-abusive-ex-spouses> [perma.cc/XA5Z-62GA].
Michele Marie Mulkey aka Michele Marie Messina v Minister of Justice of Canada on behalf of
the United States of America, 2019 CarswellQue8803, 2019 CarswellQue8804 (SCC).
Verity Stevenson, “Quebec mother who was to be extradited to U.S. on custody charge
dies in Laval jail”, CBC News (7 November 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
montreal/quebec-mother-to-be-extradited-us-dies-in-jail-1.5351567> [perma.cc/DT9PWNAD]; Matthew Behrens, “An act of institutional femicide: Remembering the life of
Michele M” (21 November 2019), online: rabble.ca <rabble.ca/columnists/2019/11/act
-institutional-femicide-remembering-life-michele-m> [perma.cc/22JX-C3WA].
Part 3 of the Extradition Act, which deals with extradition to Canada, will not be
examined here.
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MM, will be made where useful, though comprehensive treatment must be
sacrificed for brevity’s sake. Part VI will offer conclusions and suggestions
for further work.

II. FRANCE V DIAB : THE CASE THAT MAKES THE CASE FOR
REFORM
Prior to the Meng case, Hassan Diab’s was probably the only extradition
case that could truly be said to have captured substantial attention among
Canadians. Detailed accounts can be found in a thorough academic
article,14 numerous media stories,15 and most importantly a 124-page
external review by former Ontario Deputy Attorney General Murray Segal,
which was commissioned by the Justice Minister.16 In brief, the Ottawa
sociology professor was arrested on an extradition warrant in November
2008, sought by France as the alleged perpetrator of the bombing of a Paris
synagogue in 1980. Initially detained, he was released on extremely
restrictive bail conditions, including the imposition of an electronic bracelet
costing $2,000.00 per month for which he had to pay. “Justice for Hassan
Diab,” a volunteer organization, was formed to fundraise for his bail and
defence, and to lobby for staying the case and reform of Canada’s
extradition laws.17
From the outset, Diab maintained that he was the victim of mistaken
identity and had been in Lebanon at the time of the bombing. He was
eventually represented by distinguished Ottawa defence lawyer Don Bayne,
and the case was fought fiercely by both Bayne and the IAG lawyers, to the
extent that the judge at the committal hearing was moved to comment on
14

15

16

17

Maeve W. McMahon, “The Problematically Low Threshold of Evidence in Canadian
Extradition Law: An Inquiry into its Origins; and Repercussions in the Case of Hassan
Diab” (2019) 42:3 Man LJ 303.
See e.g. Amanda Connolly, “Who is Hassan Diab and why was his extradition so
controversial?”, Global News (26 July 2019), online: <globalnews.ca/news/5682551/has
san-diab-extradition-report/> [perma.cc/74D3-GF65].
Canada, Department of Justice, Independent Review of the Extradition of Dr. Hassan Diab
(Report), by Murray D. Segal (Ottawa: DOJ, May 2019), online: <www.justice.gc.ca/>
[perma.cc/9X9W-BQJY] [Segal Report].
Its website can be found here: “Justice for Hassan Diab: Preserve the Rights of
Canadians Under Extradition Law” (last modified 9 February 2020), online:
<www.justiceforhassandiab.org/> [perma.cc/S2K6-2U5S].
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its intensity.18 Diab’s defence centred on the weakness of the case presented
by France, which essentially rested on a highly-contested handwriting
analysis. Judicial decisions in the course of the proceeding featured several
now-infamous dicta. The judge who presided over the committal hearing
described the French case as being so weak that if Diab received a fair trial
in France, he would likely be acquitted—but that nonetheless, Canada’s
extradition law required that he be surrendered.19 Affirming both the
committal decision and the decision by the Minister of Justice to surrender
Diab, the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed concerns that the French case
was not even ready for trial, remarking that Diab clearly would “not simply
‘languish in prison.’”20
After being extradited, Diab did indeed “simply languish” for more
than three years, mostly in solitary confinement, in a maximum-security
prison while the French investigation continued. He was released – without
ever being committed for trial – when it became clear that the case had
foundered completely, and what evidence there was indicated that Diab was
not the bomber.21 Diab’s return to Canada in January 2018 sparked
renewed criticism from the Justice for Hassan Diab organization, now
joined by others including Amnesty International, the British Columbia
Civil Liberties Association (both of which had intervened in the original
appeal), and the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group.
Controversy increased when media reporting revealed that Canadian
officials had withheld exculpatory evidence and actively assisted French
officials in shoring up the foundering French case.22 A group of academics,
defence lawyers, and representatives from human rights organizations
convened a colloquium to formulate a set of reform proposals, which is
expected to be published in the future.23
Calls for examination of how extradition had gone so wrong drew
concern from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chrystia Freeland, who
disclosed that both she and the Prime Minister had pressed France to return

18
19
20
21
22
23

France (Republic) v Diab, 2011 ONSC 337 at para 193 [Diab Sup Ct].
Ibid at para 191.
France (Republic) v Diab, 2014 ONCA 374 at para 176 [Diab CA].
Segal Report, supra note 16 at 70–71.
This was confirmed in Segal Report, supra note 16. See section IV, below.
See Changing Canada’s Extradition Laws: The Halifax Colloquium’s Proposals for Law Reform
[forthcoming, copy on file with author]. Disclosure: I was the convenor and chair of the
Colloquium.
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Diab.24 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau stated that “what happened to [Diab]
should never have happened,” and promised that the federal government
would “make sure this never happens again.”25 However, this promise was
eventually dissipated by the Segal Report which concluded that while Diab’s
case had seen some unfortunate events, all relevant laws and policies had
been followed and all Crown personnel had acted appropriately.26
A criminal prosecution that results in an innocent person being
convicted is referred to as a “wrongful conviction.” In Hassan Diab’s case,
an extradition proceeding led to a demonstrably innocent person being
extradited to face a faulty foreign criminal process, in a case where the Prime
Minister of Canada stated that extradition “should never have happened.”
The only sensible descriptive phrase for this is “wrongful extradition,” and
that is the term that will be used in this paper. The critique here is based on
the simple premise that an extradition system that allowed the wrongful
extradition of Hassan Diab to occur must be in need of reform. This need
is made all the more pressing by the fact that, as discussed in Part V below,
the government authorities in charge of extradition are explicitly and
publicly of the view that no reform is needed and that Diab’s extradition to
France was marred only by the fact that it took so long.

III. THE CURRENT CANADIAN SCHEME FOR EXTRADITION
A. The International Law Backdrop: Sovereignty, Treaties,
and Arrangements
Extradition is the oldest and still one of the primary tools to accomplish
the goal of inter-state cooperation in the suppression of crime generally, and
transnational crime in particular. It has been defined as:
[T]he formal rendition of a criminal fugitive from a state that has custody (the
requested state) to a state that wishes either to prosecute or, if the fugitive has
24

25

26

Jim Bronskill, “Justice Minister Wilson-Raybould orders independent review of Hassan
Diab extradition case”, National Post (30 May 2018), online: <nationalpost.com/news/p
olitics/justice-minister-orders-external-review-of-hassan-diab-extradition-case> [perma.cc
/85XD-JAFJ].
David Cochrane & Lisa Laventure, “Hassan Diab to boycott external review of 2014
extradition to France”, CBC News (24 July 2018), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/h
assan-diab-boycott-external-review-france-extradition-1.4758418> [perma.cc/382M-F4F
N].
Segal Report, supra note 16 at 13–14.
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already been convicted of an offence, to enforce a penal sentence (the requesting
state).27

Extradition is made necessary by a fundamental rule of customary
international law that prohibits states from enforcing their laws on the
territories of other states.28 In the criminal sphere, this means that police
cannot investigate or effect arrests outside their own country. Accordingly,
in order for states to be able to prosecute individuals who leave or escape
from their territories,29 they enter into agreements with foreign states under
which each agrees to arrest and transmit the “fugitives” (now typically
referred to as “persons sought”) upon request and subject to certain
conditions. The most standard practice is for states to enter into bilateral
extradition treaties, which allows each government to carefully select the
states with which it wishes to have such cooperation, in accordance with
domestic priorities, human rights obligations, etc. Also, there are a number
of multilateral crime suppression treaties, geared towards facilitating interstate cooperation around suppressing particular transnational crimes,
which have extradition provisions.30
Canada is party to 51 bilateral extradition treaties31 and a large number
of the crime suppression conventions that contain extradition provisions.
A Schedule to the Extradition Act also designates certain states32 and
27

28
29

30

31

32

Robert J. Currie & Joseph Rikhof, International & Transnational Criminal Law, 3rd ed
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2020) at 531. It is important to distinguish extradition from other
legal means of removing individuals from a state, like immigration law-based
mechanisms such as deportation or the expulsion of spies or foreign diplomats.
Extradition relies explicitly on state-to-state agreements and is designed to facilitate
criminal (and, increasingly, quasi-criminal/regulatory) prosecutions. It is a formal legal
process with unique international and domestic law machinery.
R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26.
Or, at least, lawfully to do so. History is replete with examples of states simply abducting
criminal fugitives from foreign states, which is a breach of international law. See Currie
& Rikhof, supra note 29 at 560–67.
Neil Boister, An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2018), c 20; Joanna Harrington, “Extradition of Transnational
Criminals” in Neil Boister & Robert J. Currie, eds, Routledge Handbook of Transnational
Criminal Law (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015) 153.
Reasonably current compiled lists can be found at Halsbury’s Laws of Canada (online),
Extradition & Mutual Legal Assistance, “Introduction: Extradition Partners” (I.2) at HEX2 “Creation of Extradition Obligation” (2019 Reissue); Seth Weinstein & Nancy L.
Dennison, Prosecuting and Defending Extradition Cases: A Practitioner’s Handbook (Toronto:
Emond Publishing, 2017) at 15–16.
Most of which are Commonwealth states, including the United Kingdom.
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entities33 as “extradition partners,” which unlocks Canada’s extradition
machinery for those states/entities in the same manner as a treaty does.
Most commonly, Canada makes and receives extradition requests via its
bilateral treaties, particularly with the U.S.34 which unsurprisingly sees the
most traffic of any of the treaties.
While the treaties do not play a large role in this article, it is worth
noting that, constitutionally, they are strictly the preserve of the federal
executive, and “that neither Parliament nor the provincial legislatures need,
as a matter of law, to be consulted before the Crown binds Canada to an
international agreement.”35 So far as can be seen from the rather paltry
public sources on point,36 decisions on whether to negotiate extradition
treaties are formally made via consultations between the Minister of Justice
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and negotiations are conducted by
officials within those two departments. Since the introduction of the federal
treaty tabling policy in 2008, it appears that treaties are at least tabled in the
House of Commons but do not attract debate;37 nor are the explanatory
memoranda which are meant to accompany them ever published.38

33

34

35

36

37

38

Specifically, the International Criminal Court and the UN International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Treaty on Extradition between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United
States of America, United States and Canada, 3 December 1971, Can TS 1976 No 3 (in
force 22 March 1976), as amended by Protocol 1, 11 January 1988, CTS 1991 No 37 (in
force 26 November 1991) and Protocol 2, 12 January 2001, Can TS 2003 No 11 (in force
30 April 2003) [Canada-US Treaty].
Phillip M. Saunders et al, Kindred’s International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in
Canada, 9th ed (Toronto: Edmond Publishing, 2019) at 155.
A modest amount of information can be found at Canada, Department of Justice, About
the International Assistance Group (Ottawa: DOJ, last modified 20 October 2016), online:
<www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/emla-eej/about-apropos.html> [perma.cc/L222-XHYN].
“Bill C-4, An Act respecting non-for-profit corporations and certain other
corporations”, 2nd reading, House of Commons Debates, 40-2, No 010 (6 February 2009)
at 1200 (Hon Lawrence Cannon), online: <www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/e
n/40-2/house/sitting-10/hansard> [perma.cc/5LTK-M2RD] (Foreign Affairs Minister
Lawrence Cannon tabled a new Canada-Italy extradition treaty, without any comment
being made).
Gib Van Ert has commented that “Canada’s practices in the conclusion and domestic
performance of treaties remains scandalously opaque”. See Gib Van Ert, “POGG and
Treaties: The Role of International Agreements in National Concern Analysis” (8 June
2020), online (blog): Gib Van Ert <gibvanert.com/2020/06/08/the-role-of-internationa
l-agreements-in-national-concern-analysis/> [perma.cc/99MU-6J7K].
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It is worth highlighting, then, that extradition proceedings will
necessarily deprive individuals (including Canadian citizens) of their liberty,
at the hands of both the Canadian government and a foreign state; yet no
meaningful public consultation has ever been conducted by the government
as to whether we should have extradition treaties with particular states, nor
what conditions should be placed on extraditions completed under those
treaties. Even Prime Minister Trudeau’s sudden announcement in
September 2016 that Canada would begin negotiating an extradition treaty
with China seemed to emerge from some government back room and only
saw any debate because it was so publicly controversial.39

B. The Extradition Act 1999
Extradition treaties (like all treaties) are not automatically part of
Canadian law but must be implemented by way of statute. In the case of
extradition, the Extradition Act implements all of Canada’s extradition
arrangements and provides a “complete code” of procedure for extradition
to and from Canada. Prior to 1999, extradition was completed under two
different statutes: the old Extradition Act, which was modelled on the British
statute, and the now-repealed Fugitive Offenders Act, which contained a
streamlined extradition process for Commonwealth partners. The current
Act was brought in as an effort to address what the federal government
identified as inefficiencies and difficulties in Canada’s ability to extradite to
foreign states. A particular problem was said to be issues faced by foreign
states with civil justice systems, which had difficulty meeting the evidentiary
requirements of the Canadian legislation – to the point where some partner
states were discouraged from making requests at all.40 Generally speaking,
the goal was to replace Canada’s “antiquated” extradition system in order
to respond to the new realities of transnational crime and, rhetorically at
least, ensure Canada did not become a haven for criminals.
The new legislation was explicitly designed to create a more streamlined
and simplified “three-phase process” for extraditions from Canada: (1) the
39

40

Steven Chase & Robert Fife, “Justin Trudeau defends extradition treaty talks with
China”, The Globe and Mail (21 September 2016), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com
/justin-trudeau-defends-extradition-treaty-talks-with-china> [perma.cc/ZR7S-JQFB].
Elaine F. Krivel et al, A Practical Guide to Canadian Extradition (Toronto: Carswell, 2002)
at 11. An excellent account of how the new Act was ushered in can be found in
McMahon, supra note 14. McMahon notes, in particular, that while there was little
doubt that the procedural machinery needed updating, the evidence of problems
experienced by requesting states was overstated.
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“Authority to Proceed” (ATP); (2) judicial committal or discharge; and (3)
ministerial surrender or refusal to surrender for extradition.41 The front end
of the process is the ATP phase in which lawyers at the IAG receive and
evaluate the extradition request to ensure it complies with the relevant
treaty and, in particular, that the offence for which the individual is sought
is an extraditable offence. The latter point requires that there be “double
criminality” (i.e., that the offence involved is one that is punishable up to a
certain threshold by both Canada and the requesting state).42 The Canadian
offence that corresponds to the foreign offence must be explicitly identified.
The ATP itself is issued by the Minister and empowers staff counsel to, inter
alia, have the individual arrested and seek an order “committing” them for
extradition.
The committal phase, which is the focus of this article, requires a
hearing before a superior court judge who will essentially decide two things:
(1) whether the person before the court is actually the person sought and
(2) whether the evidence that has been presented by the requesting state
would be sufficient to have a person committed for trial in Canada (for the
Canadian offence identified in the ATP) if the conduct had occurred in
Canada.43 While, historically, the requesting state would have had to
actually adduce evidence that made out a prima facie case, the 1999 Act
brought in an innovation: requesting states are permitted to submit a
“Record of the Case” (ROC) which is essentially a summary of the evidence
underpinning the request. It must be accompanied by the certification of a
judicial or prosecuting authority of the requesting state, to the effect that
the evidence summarized is indeed available for trial, and either is sufficient
under that state’s law to justify prosecution or was gathered in accordance
with that state’s law.44 This provision was seemingly designed to
accommodate states (primarily from civil law traditions45) whose evidentiary
41
42

43
44
45

See MM, supra note 9 at paras 16–26.
Either a minimum of two years imprisonment under section 3 of the Act or whatever
the governing treaty says—for example, Article 2 of the Canada-US Treaty, supra note 36,
provides for extradition where the offence is punishable by one year or more of
imprisonment.
Act, supra note 6, s 29(1)(a).
Act, supra note 6, s 33.
There is a similar regime specifically provided for in the Canada-France extradition
treaty, which pre-dates the Act. See Extradition Treaty between the Government of Canada
and the Government of the Republic of France, Canada and France, 17 November 1988,
Can TS 1989 No 38 (in force 1 December 1989), art 10(2)(c).
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regimes were dissimilar to Canada’s and who would otherwise not be able
easily to produce a prima facie case based on evidence. However, it was
quickly adopted as the desirable approach by the U.S., Canada’s most
frequent requesting state, and now is used in the majority of cases.46 The
ROC regime also spares the requesting state the need to present evidence
in court, particularly viva voce evidence which is expensive and timeconsuming. The result is that the ROCs contain what Canadian lawyers
would call hearsay, unsworn statements and otherwise unsubstantiated
evidence.
The role of the committal judge is similar to, but more expansive than,
that of a preliminary inquiry judge.47 The sufficiency of evidence test under
paragraph 29(1)(a) still assesses whether the evidence shows a prima facie
case, albeit with relaxed evidentiary rules, and the judge must engage in a
“limited weighing” of the evidence (or, more accurately, the summary of the
evidence, assuming the ROC to be true) to determine whether a reasonable
jury, properly instructed, could convict on the evidence. Importantly, under
the Act, the evidence in the ROC is presumed to be reliable,48 and while
the individual sought is permitted to challenge the evidence (either
individual items or in its entirety) on the basis of reliability, they bear the
overall onus of rebutting this presumption (paragraph 32(1)(a)). In turn,
that rebuttal will only be successful where the person sought demonstrates
that the evidence is “manifestly unreliable.”49 More will be said about this
below.
If the person is committed for extradition, the process enters the
“surrender phase” where the Minister of Justice makes the final decision on
whether the individual will be extradited.50 This task has consistently been
described by the Supreme Court as “essentially political in nature,”51 in that
the Minister is primarily concerned with discharging Canada’s treaty

46

47
48
49

50
51

In a minority of cases, the requesting state can lead evidence under the terms of the
relevant extradition treaty per paragraph 32(1)(b) of the Act, supra note 6. However, it
must still establish that the evidence exists and is available for trial (United States v Ferras,
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obligations as “a responsible member of the international community.”52
While the decision must be Charter-compliant, it is one that is on “the
extreme end of the… scale” and attracts an extremely deferential standard
of review.53 This is because the Minister is exercising their capacity under
the Crown prerogative over foreign affairs, and the courts choose to be
circumspect. Sections 44 and 46 to 47 of the Act set out a number of
grounds on which the Minister can refuse surrender, some of which are
mandatory and more of which are discretionary.
Finally, it is well-established in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that
the Charter applies to the entire extradition process. The Court’s preferred
analytical lens has been section 7, which bars the state from depriving an
individual of liberty “except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice”, and it has developed a set of such principles that are
tailored to both the committal54 and ministerial55 phases (the former of
which will be dealt with here).
Committal decisions are subject to appeal,56 and surrender decisions to
judicial review,57 before the relevant provincial court of appeal, and both
can end up at the Supreme Court for final disposal if granted leave. In many
cases, both committal and surrender are challenged, and the standard
practice is to combine both appeal and judicial review into a single hearing
at both levels of court.58

C. The Role of the International Assistance Group
The IAG is a specialized division of Justice Canada which “was
established to carry out most of the responsibilities assigned to the Minister
of Justice under the Extradition Act and the Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters Act.”59 IAG acts as Canada’s “central authority”60 for all of
52
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Ferras, supra note 48; MM, supra note 9.
United States v Burns, 2001 SCC 7 [Burns]; Lake, supra note 55.
Act, supra note 6, s 49.
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Canada’s international criminal cooperation activities and administers the
government’s communication and cooperation with foreign states in this
regard. So far as extradition goes, the IAG plays a number of roles: it
develops extradition treaty relationships; it fields incoming requests from
foreign states, as well as consulting and assisting them, and also presides
over outgoing communication and requests; it obtains evidence “for use at
home or abroad, including for use in extradition”;61 it advises regional
Canadian counsel on international cooperation methods; and it approves
and issues the ATP in appropriate cases.
Most important for present purposes, IAG personnel conduct the
litigation in the adversarial extradition proceedings. They do this either
indirectly, by advising and instructing litigation counsel employed by Justice
Canada62 or, in some cases, acting as counsel in those proceedings63– which
is to say, they act as counsel for the requesting states. They also advise the
Minister on all aspects of extradition proceedings, up to and including the
drafting of Ministerial surrender decisions.64 In fundamental terms then,
IAG adversarially “prosecutes” the extradition case on behalf of the Crown
and, ultimately, the requesting state; makes the final decision regarding
surrender; and fights any appeals or judicial reviews in court. This
remarkable dominance of the entire process by a government agency will
examined in Part V below.

IV. THE JUDICIAL TASK AND ISSUES AT THAT COMMITTAL
STAGE
A. The Primary Problem: Legislative Interpretation
In MM, the current leading case on the committal process, Justice
Cromwell for the majority of the Court began the judgment by stating that
“the extradition process serves two important objectives: the prompt
compliance with Canada’s international obligations to our extradition
61
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partners, and the protection of the rights of the person sought.”65 On the
current state of the law, however, there is an imbalance between these two
“objectives.” The Extradition Act is the driver of the “extradition process,”
and the courts have consistently found that its sole objective is to facilitate
extradition. Protection of the rights of the person sought has been a
secondary objective at best, de-emphasized by the Crown and applied only
half-heartedly by the courts. From this standpoint, I will argue that the
committal process is unfair.
In the course of two decades of caselaw regarding the committal process,
the Crown has urged upon the courts – mostly successfully – two related
themes: (1) that the primary interpretive principle the courts should apply
to the Extradition Act is the safeguarding and promotion of international
comity between Canada and its extradition partner states, and (2) that
Parliament intended extradition to be an expeditious and summary process,
informed as little as possible by Canadian criminal law fundamentals. I will
briefly explain each of these in turn.
On the first theme, extradition, of course, is a tool of inter-state
cooperation that has the single goal of suppressing transnational crime, and
the achievement of this goal depends on states making effective use of
extradition treaties and arrangements. The 1999 Act was explicitly drafted
with this in mind,66 and thus it is not surprising that nearly every reported
extradition decision makes reference to some variant of Canada
maintaining “international comity” by being a good extradition partner.67
In fact, comity is basically the only interpretive principle that the courts,
urged on by the Crown, have seen fit to use.
On the second theme, the Supreme Court and lower courts have
constantly emphasized that extradition cannot be efficacious unless it is
expeditious, and that expedition, in turn, requires the procedural
machinery to be kept to a minimum. The most consistent expression of this
emphasis is that, as the majority noted in MM, “the extradition process is
not a trial and, as the Court said nearly three decades ago, it should never
be permitted to become one.”68 The committal process, in particular, is a
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“modest screening device,”69 and fairness in this process does not require a
(criminal) trial. Instead, it simply requires “that there is sufficient evidence
to justify putting the person on trial.”70
The procedural machinery will be explored below. As a preface point,
however, this matrix of emphasis is perhaps to be expected since, despite
the fact that the goal of the Act is to render people to face criminal trials,
the process created is fundamentally a non-criminal, judicial-administrative
law hybrid that incorporates certain criminal procedure machinery only by
necessity.71 In roughly the same manner that a preliminary inquiry judge
would do, the committal judge determines, essentially in the abstract,
whether the evidence proffered by the requesting state would justify
committal for trial in Canada. The presumption of innocence does not
apply, and any questions regarding defences are left for the actual criminal
trial to be held in the requesting state. The push and pull throughout the
case law, however, reflects consistent effort by the defence bar to have the
courts take into account that the entire ambit of the process is the
deprivation of liberty of the person sought and to inject an appropriate
amount of gravity and procedural protection into it – an effort that has been
largely unsuccessful.
During the following examination of issues that are raised by the
committal process, it is worth bearing in mind that the Crown’s insistence
on these two themes is fundamentally accurate. The structure of the Act and
the way the process has played out supports the view that Parliament did
indeed intend to provide for an expeditious process that was primarily
geared toward making sure extradition requests were fulfilled. Of course,
though Parliament held the pen, it was guided by the hand of Justice
Canada which formulated the legislation and the policy goals that underpin
it, steered the Act through the legislative process, and continues to negotiate
and administer the treaties and determinedly pursue extradition, all with
minimal public input. The Act is fundamentally a piece of law enforcement
legislation because it was made by law enforcers. The question for
Canadians is whether this is as it should be or whether change needs to be
made.
69
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B. Admissibility and
Invigorating Ferras

Sufficiency

of

Evidence:

Re-

1. Changes to Committal Under the 1999 Act: From Shephard to MM
To understand properly the central fairness issues with the committal
process, it is important to review the changes made by the 1999 Act. In a
detailed overview, Professor Anne Warner La Forest wrote that extradition
law had always rested on maintaining a balance between safeguarding the
liberty of the person sought and state interest in international
cooperation.72 In Canada, historically the committal process had achieved
this, more or less, by maintaining a procedural alignment between
extradition proceedings and the preliminary inquiry; the committal hearing
was in fact prescribed by the former legislation to be conducted “as nearly
as may be”73 to a preliminary inquiry. In keeping with the approach of most
common law jurisdictions, the requesting state was required to present a
prima facie case74 which, importantly, had to be based on evidence that was
admissible under Canadian law.75 The trickiest point was around hearsay,
to which common law jurisdictions like Canada took a restrictive approach
but was used liberally in other states. Since the calling of live witnesses was
too expensive and time-consuming to be justified or practical for extradition
purposes, first-person sworn/affirmed statements or affidavits were
admissible. However, second- and third-hand hearsay was not admissible,
“ensur[ing] that the evidence is reliable and that the person giving it has
received a warning that he or she must speak truthfully.”76
The test for committal, originally laid out US v Shephard,77 was the same
as that which governed preliminary inquiries: if there was evidence that
offered some form of proof on each element of the offence (i.e. sufficiency),
and assuming that evidence to be true (i.e. reliability), the judge asked
whether a reasonable trier of fact, properly instructed, could find the
accused guilty. The judge did not weigh the evidence, nor was the defence
72
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Extradition Act, RS 1985, c E-23, s 13 (repealed by the Act, supra note 6, s 129).
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allowed to challenge its reliability. However, as Professor La Forest pointed
out, this was unnecessary since the evidence was admissible under Canadian
law and thus to assume its reliability was reasonable and fair.78 This
structure allowed Canada to strike the balance between comity and the
safeguarding of liberty – the trial system of the foreign state, which might
be very different from Canada’s, was not questioned or undermined, but
Canada would only extradite a person where they could be put on trial in
similar circumstances in Canada. This was, in fact, the substance of the
double criminality principle.
The 1999 Act changed this machinery fundamentally, particularly with
the introduction of the ROC. The policy justification often proffered was
that providing evidence in a form admissible under Canadian law resulted
in extradition being difficult or even impossible for requesting states which
had civil law systems, not least because hearsay evidence was used extensively
and the concept of sworn statements was not known to those systems.79 The
solution was adopting the ROC which, as noted earlier, is a summary of
evidence supporting the charge that is certified either to be available for trial
in the requesting state or at least gathered in accordance with that state’s
law. The evidence described in the ROC is presumed reliable. The analogy
to a preliminary inquiry was kept, subject to “any modifications that the
circumstances require.”80
Importantly, the test for committal did not change and the Shephard test
was essentially codified in paragraph 29(1)(a) of the Act. As Professor La
Forest noted, this approach amounted to “retaining the prima facie standard
but relaxing the admissibility standard.”81 She argued that this upset the
balance between liberty and comity in a way that de-legitimized the process:
The logic of Shephard in terms of reliability does not apply once admissibility is
relaxed to the point of allowing second and third hand hearsay in one process and
not in the other. It is true that under the new Act, the record of the case must be
certified by a judicial or prosecuting authority in the requesting state, but that
would not be sufficient to warrant admissibility of the evidence in Canadian
proceedings. There is thus no longer an alignment between preliminary
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proceedings and extradition proceedings in Canada. It was this balance that
formed the basis for the statements in Charter decisions that the extradition
hearing was generally in accordance with fundamental justice. If it is accepted that
it is a basic tenet of our legal system that a person cannot be bound over for trial
in this jurisdiction based upon the kind of evidence provided for in the new Act,
then it can be postulated that, in general, it is contrary to fundamental justice to
extradite a person, who may well be a Canadian national, to a requesting state
based upon that evidence to face trial in that country.82

Essentially, Canada had gone from a system where committal should be
ordered based on evidence that was admissible under Canadian law, to one
where committal should be ordered based on the fact that evidence could
be shown to exist even though that evidence would not necessarily have
been admissible under Canadian law83 and could not realistically be tested.
“Indeed,” Professor La Forest memorably remarked, “other than as a matter
of form, it is difficult to understand why the judicial role has been retained
in the new Act, as the extradition judge has little, if anything, to do.”84
For some years after the Act’s coming into force, the Crown advanced
the argument that the sufficiency test had not changed from Shephard and
that, despite the changes regarding admissibility of evidence, the committal
judge had no discretion to review, weigh, or evaluate the evidence put
forward in the ROC. In a set of constitutional challenges led by the case of
R v Ferras,85 however, the Supreme Court took up the substance of Professor
La Forest’s suggestion that the new Act had swung the balance over into
unconstitutional territory. Noting that “[t]he Act is silent on whether the
judge has a residual discretion to exclude evidence that is unreliable or
dangerous,”86 Chief Justice McLachlin for the Court held that using the
preliminary inquiry structure as an analogue for the committal hearing
could not, as a matter of “fundamental justice” under section 7 of the
Charter, be pushed as far as the Shephard test permitted. It might be
acceptable to deprive trial judges of the ability to weigh or evaluate evidence
82
83
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in the context of committal for trial in Canada because evidence was
admitted in a preliminary inquiry “according to the domestic rules of
evidence, with all of the inherent guarantees of threshold reliability that
those rules entail.”87 In the extradition context, however, this protection was
not present, which would “deprive the subject of his or her constitutional
right to a meaningful judicial determination before the subject is sent out
of the country and loses his or her liberty.”88 This, the Court ruled, was
constitutionally infirm:
[T]he combined effect of the relevant provisions (ss. 29, 32 and 33 of the Act) may
be to deprive the person sought of the independent hearing and evaluation
required by the principles of fundamental justice applicable to extradition. If the
extradition judge possesses neither the ability to declare unreliable evidence
inadmissible nor to weigh and consider the sufficiency of the evidence, committal
for extradition could occur in circumstances where committal for trial in Canada
would not be justified. I take as axiomatic that a person could not be committed
for trial for an offence in Canada if the evidence is so manifestly unreliable that it
would be unsafe to rest a verdict upon it. It follows that if a judge on an extradition
hearing concludes that the evidence is manifestly unreliable, the judge should not
order extradition under s. 29(1). Yet, under the current state of the law
in Shephard, it appears that the judge is denied this possibility.89

It is worth pausing at this point to observe that in support of these
points, Chief Justice McLachlin pointedly cited Professor La Forest’s
criticism that the committal judges “have nothing left to do.”90 “The judge,”
she wrote, “becomes a rubber stamp.”91 One might conclude that this
unconstitutional and unfair hollowing out of judicial process was, in fact, a
deliberate product of the 1999 Extradition Act’s design or, at the very least,
a product of the Crown’s litigation strategy in proceedings under the Act.92
To remedy the situation, the Court read down subsection 29(1) such
that it granted the committal judge discretion “to refuse to extradite on
insufficient evidence such as where the reliability of the evidence certified
is successfully impeached or where there is no evidence, by certification or
87
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otherwise, that the evidence is available for trial.”93 In terms of impeaching
the reliability of the evidence, the person sought could lead their own
evidence or make arguments about the evidence in the ROC. Informed in
this way, the judge could “engage in a limited weighing of evidence to
determine whether there was a plausible case.”94 However, the evidence was
presumed reliable and the challenge could only be successful if the evidence
was “so defective or appears so unreliable that the judge concludes it would
be dangerous or unsafe to convict”95 or (in the phrase that ultimately shaped
the jurisprudence) the evidence could be shown to be “manifestly
unreliable.”96 Notably, the Court did not go as far as Professor La Forest
might have preferred, as the presumption of reliability essentially meant
automatic admissibility in the absence of challenge from the person sought;
the American ROC in Ferras itself featured hearsay that came from
unsavoury witnesses.
While early commentary hailed the Ferras framework as bringing muchneeded rigour to the committal decision,97 the Crown immediately went
about narrowing the window of fundamental justice that Ferras had tried to
open. It found success and a sympathetic ear with Justice Doherty in the
case of United States of America v Anderson.98 While conceding that Ferras had
“turned a new jurisprudential page in the law of extradition,”99 Justice
Doherty characterized the scrutiny of the requesting state’s evidence as a
“limited qualitative evaluation” that:
[D]oes not envision weighing competing inferences that may arise from the
evidence. It does not contemplate that the extradition judge will decide whether a
witness is credible or his or her evidence is reliable. Nor does it call upon the
extradition judge to evaluate the relative strength of the case put forward by the
requesting state. There is no power to deny extradition in cases that appear to the
extradition judge to be weak or unlikely to succeed at trial.100

93
94

95
96
97
98
99
100

Ferras, supra note 48 at para 50.
Ibid at para 54. The “limited weighing” predominantly refers to testing the inferences
sought to be established by circumstantial evidence pursuant to R v Arcuri, 2001 SCC
54.
Ibid at para 40.
Ibid.
See Botting, “The Supreme Court ‘Decodes’ the Extradition Act”, supra note 85.
Anderson, supra note 51. See also United States v Thomlinson, 2007 ONCA 42.
Anderson, supra note 51 at para 26.
Ibid at para 28 [emphasis added].

22 MANITOBA LAW JOURNAL
Evidence, he wrote, could be rendered defective or unreliable “due to
problems inherent in the evidence itself, problems that undermine the
credibility or reliability of the source of the evidence, or a combination of
those two factors,” but it was only where the concerns with the evidence
became “sufficiently powerful to justify the complete rejection of the
evidence” that they were even “germane” to the sufficiency of evidence
inquiry.101 The presumption of reliability could only be overcome where the
person sought could demonstrate “fundamental inadequacies or frailties”
in the requesting state’s evidence.”102
Justice Doherty’s dicta in Anderson were influential in subsequent case
law. The other most influential appellate court in extradition matters, the
British Columbia Court of Appeal, initially resisted the tone struck by
Anderson103 but softened its approach over time.104 The coup de grace came
from Justice Cromwell whose judgment in MM put an authoritative seal on
the Anderson line of case law. Stating that he “largely agree[d]” with Justice
Doherty’s interpretation of Ferras, Justice Cromwell echoed the narrowing
language from Anderson105 and further shrank any hope of meaningful
evaluation of the requesting state’s evidence:
Ferras does not call upon the extradition judge to evaluate the relative strength of
the case put forward by the requesting state. There is no power to deny extradition
simply because the case appears to the extradition judge to be weak or unlikely to
succeed at trial.106

Justice Cromwell then went on to impose an additional procedural
hurdle to a challenge of the requesting state’s evidence. He noted that the
task of the extradition judge was only one of limited weighing of the
requesting state’s evidence, and that any evidence sought to be used to
challenge reliability had to be discretely relevant to this task. Accordingly,
before even being allowed to lead the evidence, the person sought would
have to make “an initial showing that the proposed evidence is realistically
capable of satisfying the high standard that must be met in order to justify
refusing committal on the basis of unreliability of the requesting state’s
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evidence.”107 Analogously to a Vukelich motion,108 this “initial showing”
could include “summaries or will-say statements or similar offers of
proof.”109
Justice Cromwell concluded by offering what he called “examples of
evidence that may or may not meet the high threshold justifying a refusal of
committal on the basis of unreliability of the evidence.” His list of examples
which “may not” meet the high threshold (because it was “irrelevant or not
sufficiently cogent”110) included111 evidence that: goes to witness credibility;
attempts to establish a competing inference of innocence; attempts to
establish a defence; or presents a “different or exculpatory account of
events.”112 Justice Cromwell offered no specific examples of evidence that
“may” meet the high threshold, offering instead that even the types of
evidence he had just referred to might establish unreliability in “certain, and
likely fairly unusual cases” if it was “of virtually unimpeachable authenticity
and reliability.” However, such cases would be “very rare.”113

2. Ferras and Fairness
In my view, Ferras’s promise of restoring a meaningful screening role for
the committal judge has evaporated. This is because the Court’s view in
Ferras of the role played by the presumption that the ROC is reliable was
too sanguine or even incautious. Practically speaking, rebutting the
presumption of reliability is not only a difficult hill to scale but an
impossible one. Individuals sought routinely challenge reliability on the
basis of information known to them or that can be squeezed out of the ROC
documents themselves – bearing in mind that these are tailored by the
requesting states and the IAG and that disclosure is practically a non-starter
– only to meet a ruling that questions regarding the reliability of the
evidence should be handled by the trial court in the requesting state.
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Between them, the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court have
essentially interpreted Ferras out of practical existence.
It is helpful to contextualize this argument with reference to what might
inelegantly be referred to as the Crown’s “win/loss record” in extradition
cases generally, and at the committal stage specifically. Anecdotally
speaking, it is well-known among defence lawyers that arrest of a client on
an extradition warrant means they are usually facing a process that is
practically a fait accompli, and that the best advice the lawyer can give is to
immediately retain local counsel in the requesting state in hope of
negotiating a plea deal in exchange for waiving the extradition process.114 A
well-known “joke” about extradition is that there is only one question that
needs answering: aisle or window seat?115 In light of Hassan Diab’s wrongful
extradition to France this “joke” seems in poor taste, yet it accurately
captures the extent to which, at least in the perception of non-Crown people
interested in extradition, the deck is stacked.
This anecdotal understanding is borne out, moreover, by data. In terms
of the broader question of whether extradition efforts by the Crown result
in extradition, any brief look at the extradition case law would indicate that
the overwhelming majority of challenges to extradition are lost by the
person sought and result in “success” for the Crown.116 This figure would
not take into account those cases where extradition is not contested by the
person sought, which would make the Crown’s “success” rate higher still.
In the wake of Hassan Diab’s return from France, IAG disclosed statistics
which indicated that individuals sought are in fact surrendered in 90% of
cases.117
More to the point of this article, however, is that a look specifically at
reported committal decisions shows that Justice Cromwell aptly described
successful challenges to the requesting state’s case as “very rare.” As one
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reliable text notes,118 successful challenges at the committal hearing are rare,
and successful appeals of committal orders are rarer still. Moreover, in 2017
I directed a study of 198 post-Ferras committal decisions reported between
2006 and 2017, which revealed only 16 successful challenges among all of
the cases.119
It is important to acknowledge that these numbers represent a crude
measure of a more nuanced situation. While this is an unpopular view
among defence lawyers, it seems sensible to conclude that a strong plurality,
if not a majority, of extradition requests are well-founded and rest on a
reasonable evidential record. Moreover, if an extradition case is put forward
by the IAG for a committal hearing, then this means that the ROC has been
evaluated – in light of both the relevant treaty and the Act – and the Crown
has a certain amount of confidence in the overall quality of the case. The
IAG notes publicly that it is responsible for Canada’s communications and
dealings with its extradition partners,120 and it is reasonable to infer (and
has been anecdotally indicated to me) that weaker or ill-founded requests
are either screened out or sent back to the requesting state for repair. On
this logic then, a simple request-to-committal ratio does not account for the
legal strength of those cases that actually proceed through the process.
However, on the specific issue of the committal test, a look at the 16
successful cases from the above-noted survey is revealing. In a strong
majority of them, committal was not refused because the requesting state’s
evidence (almost always in an ROC) was – in the language of Ferras –
“defective or unreliable,” but because evidence was simply not present on
one or more elements of the charged offence. For example, in Kamaldin the
allegation was that the six persons sought had engaged in telemarketing
118
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fraud, but for one of the six, Iacino, the only evidence was that he had
visited the site of the operation once and was there when arrests were
executed; there were no fingerprints or any other evidence of his
participation in the offences. In three other fraud cases (Valde, Pataki, and
Gillingham), evidence of mens rea was missing from the requesting state’s case
as to some of the persons sought. In Pelchat, evidence of the actus reus of
manufacturing a controlled substance was missing, as was evidence of aiding
and abetting the production. In Di Rienzo, two of the five people sought
were discharged because the evidence did not show proof of their
knowledge of the conspiracies for which they were sought; a similar
discharge resulted in Cheema. In Aneja, the person sought was committed
on several charges relating to a fraud investigation but discharged on
obstruction of justice because his impugned statements did not relate to the
investigation itself, and there was therefore a gap in evidence on the actus
reus of the offence. In Walker, there was so little information relating to an
alleged eyewitness identification that the committal judge could not even
determine sufficiency.121 In Seifert, the person sought was committed on a
number of charges but discharged on one for which there was no evidence
of causation and another for which there was no evidence of causation or
identity.122
Some of the cases show a mixture of a lack of evidence and “defective
and unreliable” evidence. In Yu, one of the persons sought, Chuck, was
discharged because the evidence in the ROC purporting to implicate him
in the charges was a mixture of mistaken identification, inconsistent
inferences, bad translation, and baseless assertions by investigators. In Laird,
the person sought was accused of having drugged and sexually assaulted the
victim, but there was no evidence of how the victim had ingested the drug
and the Crown’s inferences were, at best, speculation. In Anderson, the judge
struck summaries of Canadian-gathered wiretap evidence from the ROC
because it had not been led in the hearing, as required under the Act, and,
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as a result, the case suffered from a total absence of proof regarding some of
the persons sought.123
In all of these cases, the challenged evidence was fairly hopeless; even
bearing in mind the challenges of dealing with authorities in requesting
states and the development of evidentiary records, one wonders why the
Crown went forward. In any event, Ferras promised that the person sought
would have the opportunity to challenge weak evidence, but what the case
law shows is this: all the law truly seems to provide is the much narrower
opportunity, in cases where there really is no evidence, to point it out. Other
reliability issues with the requesting state’s evidence, no matter how grave,
are simply left for the requesting state’s trial courts to sort out. It also raises
the possibility that after the constriction of Ferras between Anderson and
MM, the window of fairness for the person sought is so narrow that we must
be fearful that wrongful extraditions are happening.
This is not to say that our extradition process is itself wholly toxic; by
analogy, we do not mistrust the entire criminal justice system because we
know there are problems with wrongful convictions. However, in the latter
space, the Supreme Court of Canada, appellate courts, and successive
government inquiries have shaped the common law and pushed
Parliamentary reform to deal with the problem. In the extradition space, the
Crown-designed process is accepted, mostly uncritically, by the courts, and
reform proposals do not attract interest.
If the examples cited above are not completely convincing on this point,
there is no better support for this argument than the Diab case. The
evidence in the French ROC was mostly geared toward identifying an
individual known as “Panadriyu” as the bomber, and the case came down
to a handwriting analysis report by a French expert which purported to link
Diab’s handwriting to samples of handwriting suspected to be that of
Panadriyu. The reliability of the report was attacked by three defence
experts, and among the committal judge’s findings were that the report
“ha[d] been shown to be based on some questionable methods and on an
analysis that seems very problematic”124 and was “susceptible to a great deal
of criticism and attack;”125 it was “convoluted, very confusing, [and] with
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conclusions that are suspect.”126 However, relying on Anderson, the judge
found that he had no choice but to order committal; despite these “major
weaknesses,” choosing between competing expert views was ultimately the
task of the foreign trial court and, somehow, the presumption of reliability
was not overcome.127 The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, noting that
the expert evidence could only have been “manifestly unreliable” if it was
“devoid of reliability and of utility to the fact finder.”128
With respect, it is difficult to imagine a case where evidence proffered
by the requesting state was more “devoid of reliability and utility,” and yet
it was on the basis of this report that Hassan Diab was extradited to France
to face a prosecutorial case that, as noted above, ultimately fell apart. This
case therefore demonstrates two interlocking problems. First, if the
“questionable,” “problematic,” “convoluted,” “confusing,” and “suspect”
evidence in Diab was not manifestly unreliable, then arguably the test
cannot actually be met. If there is any evidence, regardless of how poor or
suspect, then the trial court in the requesting state is the appropriate place
deal with its problems. Canada’s courts are truly applying the old Shephard
test and just calling it by another name.
Second, if one accepts that the test has been correctly stated and is being
correctly applied in law (in cases like Diab and MM), then it is acceptable
for Canadians to be extradited on the basis of evidence that is
“questionable,” “problematic,” “convoluted,” “confusing,” and “suspect” –
and by way of a process in which it is essentially impossible meaningfully to
challenge that evidence and bring out its weakness. Surely, such an unfair
process is not in line with “fundamental justice” such that it is acceptable
to Canadians. In Ferras the Supreme Court promised a “meaningful judicial
determination,”129 but individuals like Hassan Diab did not receive and are
not receiving it. Compliance with the principles of fundamental justice
under section 7 of the Charter demands better. Since, as Justice Cromwell
wrote in MM, “[t]here is no power to deny extradition simply because the
case appears to the extradition judge to be weak or unlikely to succeed at
trial,”130 then Diab’s case shows that such a power needs to be created.
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3. Efficiency and Expeditiousness
This problem is compounded by the insistence in the extradition
jurisprudence that extradition is intended to be “expeditious and efficient”,
even summary in nature – which infects not only what scrutiny is to be given
to the requesting state’s case but, generally, how fair the committal hearing
must be in order to be Charter-compliant. The most currently authoritative
version of this can be found in MM. Charged with abducting her children,
Messina had argued that the defence of necessity would be available to her
if the conduct had occurred in Canada, as she had been helping her
children to flee their abusive father, and thus double criminality could not
be made out. For the majority, Justice Cromwell took the opportunity to
reinforce what he referred to as “long-settled principles about the
extradition process,”131 which centred around the theme that
“expeditiousness and efficiency” mean that “an extradition hearing is not a
trial and it should never be permitted to become one.”132 This weighed
against the argument that defences could even be considered at the
committal stage since committal had fundamentally the same limited
function as a preliminary inquiry, which is to determine whether there is
any evidence that justified committal for trial. Defences, Justice Cromwell
wrote, “have never formed part of the test for committal to trial in the
preliminary inquiry context,” and to allow consideration of them “would
fundamentally change the nature of the extradition hearing, making it more
akin to a trial.”133 Ferras, he conceded, had expanded the scope of the
committal judge’s powers somewhat due to its requirement that the judge
be permitted to engage in a limited weighing of the requesting state’s
evidence. However, this did not expand the issues to which the judge was
confined to considering:
Ferras’s insistence on a meaningful judicial determination by the extradition judge
speaks only to the rigour that an extradition judge must bring to the assessment of
the evidence. Ferras did not — indeed could not — change by judicial decree the
statutory requirement that the requesting state has only to show that the record
would justify committal for trial in Canada. The committal for trial process has
never been concerned with possible defences on which the accused bears an
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evidential or persuasive burden and Ferras provides no support for any
fundamental change to this statutory test for committal.134

A three-judge dissent led by Justice Abella argued that any meaningful
application of the concept of “double criminality” meant that the committal
judge must take into account clear evidence showing that the person sought
has a defence available. While Justice Cromwell responded – correctly in
my view – that this did damage to the statutory language that clearly
confined the committal process and any defence-side evidence to the
firmness of the requesting state’s evidence,135 Justice Abella’s reasons were
grounded in Ferras’s fundamental holding that the committal process is only
Charter-compliant if there is “meaningful judicial assessment” of the
evidence. She wrote:
A meaningful judicial determination of whether the double criminality
requirement is met should not be sacrificed on the altar of potential concerns of
expediency, comity and cost. These concerns are adequately addressed in the
existing extradition process and not undermined by consideration of the viability
of a [necessity] defence. In any event, they must be counterbalanced against the
need for a meaningful judicial assessment of the case based on the evidence and
the law so that the liberty interests of the person sought for extradition are fully
respected and protected.136

The dissenting argument has much to commend. It is reasonable to say
that extradition should not become a trial, but if it is to comport with basic
fairness, neither does it need to be the furthest thing from a trial. Allowing
consideration of defences might depart from the preliminary inquiry
structure upon which committal is based, but as the Court itself pointed
out in Ferras, the Act does not demand slavish adherence to that structure.137
If compliance with the principles of fundamental justice could justify
expanding the scope of evidentiary consideration as a “meaningful judicial
process,” it could safely justify including consideration of defences as well.
It is worth remembering that preliminary inquiries (a fully criminal
procedure) and extradition (a process Crown personnel insist on referring
to as “civil”) may have technically similar goals but produce different results.
A person who is committed for trial after a preliminary inquiry is going to
face a trial within the Canadian criminal justice system, in which we are
confident. A person extradited faces consequences which are “more
134
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onerous.”138 Like Hassan Diab, this person will be sent to a foreign state
where they may never have been139 and where they may not speak the local
language; they may face a foreign justice system that has significant
problems, such as prosecutors who wish to rely on secret intelligence as
evidence or have drawn conclusions on the basis of incompetently-gathered
evidence.140 Like Michele Messina, a defence that would be available to
them under Canadian law may not even be available in the requesting state,
in a case engaging the kind of gendered violence that Canada has
committed both domestically and internationally to combat.141
“Fundamental justice” by way of a “meaningful judicial process” may
require a broader scope of inquiry.
The six to three margin in MM shows, however, that challenging the
current Crown-driven view of the extradition process – which is supported
by decades of extradition jurisprudence – is an uphill battle. The debate in
MM around whether defences can be considered in the committal hearing
is emblematic of the fact that the current process, underpinned by
overwhelming judicial acceptance of the Crown’s policy agenda, has
essentially fetishized the mantras of “extradition cannot be a trial” and
“extradition must be efficient.” Even if one accepts that the current system
is defensible in terms of complying with the scheme Parliament has laid out
in the 1999 Extradition Act, it is worth asking the hard but basic democratic
question: now that we have seen it in action for over 20 years, is this kind
of process actually what Canadians want? It may be, as Justice Cromwell
wrote in MM, that “[b]asic fairness to the person sought does not require
that the extradition process have all of the safeguards of a trial”142 but
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safeguards it should have. In my view, there are aspects of basic fairness
missing from the extradition machinery which could potentially be
remedied by changes that maintain efficiency and keep extradition from
devolving into some kind of preliminary trial while, at the same time, do a
more robust, effective, and Charter-compliant job of protecting the rights of
the individual sought. If changes would mean going beyond “settled
principles” of extradition law, then it is time to unsettle those principles.

4. Reforming the Committal Phase: How to Right the Ship?
This article will not provide a re-write of the Extradition Act’s provisions
dealing with committal, though this should be done and only after scrutiny
by a Parliamentary committee with substantial (and heretofore sorelylacking) public input. A judicial inquiry into the Hassan Diab case, as was
proposed by Diab and his many supporters, would also serve to highlight
problems and generate solutions. However, a few proposals can be offered.
The primary focus of reform efforts should be on un-neutering the
“meaningful judicial process” that Ferras framed as a principle of
fundamental justice by making the system fairer to the person sought.
Extradition can and probably should, in some sense, be expeditious, and it
makes sense that committal should not be a preliminary attempt to litigate
the anticipated criminal trial in the requesting state. However,
“expeditious” does not mean “summary,” and the current formulation of
the committal process is just that. It requires some expansion to be fair.
The Halifax Colloquium143 has proposed a number of interlocking
reforms that would be worth exploring. An explicit but modified invocation
of the presumption of innocence on the process would provide balance:
“explicit” in that it should be inserted into the Act, but “modified” in that
it would not bring with it an obligation on the Crown to offer proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. The idea would be to send the signal to the committal
judge that an adjudication of guilt or innocence is sought by the Crown at
the end of the process, and that the requesting state’s case should be
appropriately scrutinized and some equality of arms between the Crown and
defence actively sought.
One way to achieve the latter goal would be to remove the presumption
of reliability from the ROC approach and require the Crown to prove
reliability on a balance of probabilities. Even if the threshold to be met
could be shaped by taking into account the peculiarities of the extradition
143
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context – and perhaps be slightly more modest for the Crown – this change
would sweep away the current dysfunction around the “manifestly
unreliable” standard. Making this exercise meaningful, in turn, could be
accomplished by moving somewhat back in the direction of the old prima
facie case requirement – to wit, key witness evidence could be offered in the
form of affidavits and the affiants made available for cross-examination.
“The purpose of the cross-examination would be to explore whether the
witness is fundamentally reliable and not for exploring credibility simpliciter.
This is especially important if the witness has taken a plea deal”144 or is
otherwise what Canadian law would label a Vetrovec witness.
To the extent that this proposal would appear regressive, unwieldy, or
undesirable, there are 21st century solutions that would buff off the rough
edges. Recalling that an explicit rationale for abandoning the prima facie case
approach in the new Act was that some foreign legal systems do not have
the capacity to generate what we recognize as sworn evidence, Canada could
agree with the requesting state that a government official in the foreign state
could take the witness’s affidavit in a special but brief procedure in which
Canadian law would apply. If this seems overly complex, it is not; Canada
already has such arrangements in place in some of its mutual legal assistance
treaties (MLATs),145 and provisions could be inserted into existing MLATs
or even into the extradition treaties themselves. So far as cross-examination
goes, in post-COVID 19 times, video-conferencing is an eminently practical
solution, and one which is, in fact, already used to allow testimony from
foreign witnesses in domestic criminal trials.146
Despite Murray Segal’s recommendation that ROCs be more
“streamlined and economical” – i.e., contain even less than they currently
do – his scrutiny of the Diab case led him to recommend that in any case
where the requesting state intends to rely on expert reports, the reports must
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be led in evidence and not simply summarized in the ROC.147 He invoked
in justification the findings of the Goudge Inquiry, among others, that
untrustworthy expert opinion has played a role in wrongful convictions and
is worthy of special scrutiny and caution.148 In light of Diab, where
unreliable expert evidence caused a wrongful extradition, this makes good
sense. While Segal stopped short of recommending that the reports be held
admissible in accordance with the White Burgess test in Canadian evidence
law (an argument that the committal court and the Court of Appeal rejected
in Diab), this too would seem logical. Moreover, the IAG should make it
clear to treaty partners that this kind of evidence, in particular, must
mandatorily be disclosed for extradition purposes if it is going to be led at
trial; this could be backed by a treaty obligation, if necessary.
The Halifax Colloquium also proposed that the committal judge should
admit and consider defence-side evidence on any excuse, defence, or
justification that would be available to a person sought under either
Canadian law or the law of the requested state. A robustly-proven defence
might produce a discharge. In light of MM firmly slamming the door shut
on this point, it is likely that it would need to be accomplished through
amending the Act. However, there is a model to start with, as federal
immigration proceedings considering criminal inadmissibility explicitly
consider available defences and immunities.149
Even in my mind, this is something that would have to be carefully
calibrated given the potential for time-wasting and disruption it might
cause. It should probably be limited to affirmative defences rather than
simple attacks on the elements of the offence (e.g., “I did not intend to do
it” as an attack on mens rea). It might be that the evidence would need to
have an “air of reality” even to be considered, much as is required in
criminal cases.150 Otherwise, it is too easy to imagine defences based on bare
assertions (e.g., “she attacked me, it was self-defence”). A modified air of
reality test might be applied, such that the judge would have to find that a
reasonable jury could find the defence to be made out on a balance of
probabilities (rather than just raising a reasonable doubt), even for those
defences that do not require this standard of proof under Canadian law.
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At its most conservative, perhaps this change could apply only in cases
like MM itself where the main problem was that the evidence disclosed a
defence that would have been available to Messina in Canada but was not
available to her in the requesting state. As the dissent in MM argued
powerfully, denying a challenge in this situation flies in the face of any
meaningful version of double criminality, if not the technical manner in
which it currently operates. The majority justified precluding this issue from
consideration by the committal judge by noting that it is within the purview
of the Minister to consider it when making the surrender decision.151
Whether the Act appropriately balances the tasks in the extradition process
between the judicial and Ministerial phases will be the subject of a future
article. Suffice it to say that the issue of availability of defences is, in my
view, a predominantly legal question that belongs in the hands of a judge
who is directed by discrete statutory language formulated by Parliament –
and not in those of a Minister of the Crown who is making an explicitly
“political” decision that enjoys the most deferential standard of review
known to Canadian administrative law.152
This point of view also reflects the reality that, so far as any meaningful
public information could show, there are very few cases in which the
Minister has actually refused surrender.153 Stays of surrender, even in
meritorious cases, mostly only occur where the courts can be convinced to
order them, and this too is rare.154 The tragic result of the MM case gives
some measure of the reality around this and of the troubling enthusiasm for
extradition on the Crown side, to which this paper now turns.

V. THE ROLE OF THE CROWN
A. Crown “Culture”
As noted in Section III.C above, Justice Canada is responsible for
conducting extradition proceedings on behalf of the Crown, both through
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the IAG and litigation counsel. In this section, I will argue that part of the
problem with how extradition proceedings generally, and the committal
phrase in particular, are conducted is in the way that the Crown and the
law conceive the Crown’s role and in how that role is executed.
The Crown side of extradition is notoriously murky, a fact remarked
upon even by the Segal Report155 which was otherwise sympathetic to the
Crown’s role in the Diab case. However, the same Report does shed some
light on how the Crown actually operates through the committal and
surrender process.156 In Diab, an IAG lawyer interacted closely with the
investigating judge in France,157 conducting and co-ordinating
communications between French and Canadian authorities. In particular,
this lawyer worked closely with the Canadian legal team that was actually
litigating the committal proceedings, assisting with evidentiary and other
requests. The litigation team itself was staffed by IAG lawyers and staff.158
After committal, IAG counsel prepared the usual report for the Minister,
facilitated defence submissions on surrender, provided legal advice to the
Minister, and drafted his surrender decision. IAG counsel also litigated the
appeal of the committal decision and the judicial review of the surrender
decision.
The Crown side, then, is essentially a unit, populated by lawyers and
support staff among whom there is some differentiation of roles, but all of
whom are working toward the same goal. Accurately articulating what that
goal is, however, is key to understanding the true nature of the process. To
frame it provocatively, is the goal “producing a fair result in an extradition
proceeding,” or is it “producing extradition, at whatever cost?”
Describing the Crown’s role accurately, in terms of how it currently
exists, will be helpful to ground suggestions about what it should be and
how it should be structured. A key point is that the Crown differentiates its
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role in extradition proceedings from the role of Crown prosecutors and
specifically does not feel bound by prosecutors’ enhanced obligation to
achieve fairness in proceedings and results. The Segal Report, which was
based in part on Segal’s interviews with IAG personnel, explains this
cogently. A Crown prosecutor, in line with traditional authority,159 is not
acting as counsel for any particular party but is instead “a quasi-Minister of
Justice”160 simply concerned with producing a just result and eschewing any
notion of “winning” or “losing.” In extradition proceedings, by contrast, the
Crown is acting as counsel for a party (specifically, the requesting state) and
is indeed seeking a “win” for its client through “a more purely adversarial
role”:
Before a trial in Canada, Crowns must consider whether there is a reasonable
prospect of conviction. They also have an obligation to evaluate the strength of
their case at all stages of the proceedings. These types of considerations are not
relevant to counsel for the Attorney General in extradition proceedings. These
government lawyers are not charged with looking into the future and asking
whether, down the line, there will be problems with the case or whether there is a
reasonable prospect that the evidence available is capable of convincing a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the objective of counsel for the Attorney
General at the judicial phase is modest: can they establish a prima facie case against
the person sought? There is good reason for this more circumscribed role. Counsel
for the Attorney General in extradition proceedings are not building a case for
trial. They are not responsible for and may not be knowledgeable about the trial
procedures available in the requesting state; and, more to the point, they do not
know what evidence will ultimately be available for trial in that country.161

On this view, then, the Crown’s job in extradition proceedings is to
facilitate extradition. The Crown is fighting the person sought, on behalf of
its client. The committal phase – indeed, the entire process – is adversarial
and, beyond complying with ethics and procedure, no holds should be
barred. Protections for the person sought can be sought by that person; the
system is designed to be fair and Charter-compliant, and of course the
individual will be represented by able counsel. The nature of the process, as
explained in the excerpt above, drives the scope of the Crown’s function.
Or so goes the narrative. Putting aside the argument in section III above
(that the system is neither fairly designed nor Charter-compliant), and
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putting aside the pressing issue of access to justice in this country and
whether individuals sought will even have meaningful access to counsel,162
I would argue that this is a cultural standpoint and not a legal one. This is
not to say that it has no grounding in law – quite the contrary, in fact. This
view of the Crown’s role is certainly facilitated by the structure of the Act
and the Crown-side policy arguments that have found favour in the
jurisprudence.163 However, this construction of the role has been chosen by
the Crown for itself. It is by no means an inevitable version of what the role
of the Crown might be in a reasonable, fair, and Charter-compliant
extradition process.
To say that the Crown’s role is the simple one of demonstrating a
sufficient case for committal, and that it is divorced from any knowledge of
or responsibility for the trial in the requesting state, is simply a policy choice.
To repeat the mantra of “extradition is not a trial, the trial takes place in
the requesting state” is also a choice, and this particular choice artificially
dissociates Canada from the result of the extradition process: the ultimate
fate of the person sought. To say “extradition is not a criminal law process”
ignores the fact that the goal of the process is to have the person sought
wrung through the criminal justice system of a foreign state164 and either
into its prisons or some other hardship. Hassan Diab and Michele Messina
learned this lesson, as they say, the hard way, and no sensible person would
say that Canada was not instrumental to what happened to each of them.
Putting the interests of comity at the front does, of course, drive an
argument that this dissociation is necessary or inevitable; we must respect
the processes of our foreign partners and so on. However, the best
counterargument can be found in the part of the extradition process where
comity matters most, which is the surrender phase. At that point, the
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Minister is constrained by the Charter not to surrender the individual to the
foreign state in circumstances where their fate, as a result of being
surrendered, would not be consistent with the principles of fundamental
justice.165 Comity is balanced against that vital, constitutional interest. That
is to say, what will happen to the individual as a result of actually being
surrendered is a driver of the law in the surrender phase. There is no
principled reason that, properly tailored, this legal interest cannot be taken
into account at the committal stage. There is no reason that committal
needs to be almost166 completely unconcerned with the criminal process and
trial that awaits the person sought. There is, moreover, no reason that
Crown personnel cannot act as “ministers of justice” in committal
proceedings.
To reach this conclusion, however, would take not only legislative
amendment but a shift in the culture among Crown personnel who conduct
extradition cases. Again, it is sometimes necessary to resort to anecdotal
evidence to make certain points, both because there is so little inquiry and
commentary on extradition in Canada and because Justice Canada and the
IAG in particular are so opaque and secretive.167 Anecdotally speaking,
then, it is well-known in Canadian circles that the Crown is ferocious and
extremely adversarial in advancing the interests of its “clients” in extradition
matters. Given the view of its role as expressed in the Segal Report, this
would be unsurprising, and, of course, litigation is hardly a “tea party” as
the old saying goes; one could expect, and even hope, for some tough
lawyering given the important goals that extradition fulfills.
That said, this adversarial stance sometimes appears excessive. In the
case of Abdullah Khadr, for example, disclosure during the committal
hearing revealed that the requesting state, the U.S., had engaged in what
the committal judge termed “gross misconduct,” not least by putting a
bounty on the head of the person sought, facilitating his mistreatment by
Pakistani security forces, and breaching Canada’s right of access to its citizen
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under international law.168 It seemed clear that in requesting Khadr after all
of this, the US was clearly abusing the process of Canada’s courts, yet the
Crown pressed for extradition. When the committal judge stayed the
proceeding because it was an abuse of process, the Crown appealed to the
Ontario Court of Appeal where Justice Sharpe denounced both the
extradition request and some of the Crown’s legal arguments in no
uncertain terms, noting that to allow extradition in such circumstances
would undermine the rule of law.169 The Crown’s response? A leave
application to the Supreme Court of Canada which was denied.170
The pressing question, in my view, is why the Crown “went to the wall”
(to again use a colloquial phrase) on this case. The basis of the appeal
seemed to be the issue of whether the two levels of court were somehow misapplying the test for abuse of process, though the arguments were not
convincing. The leave application itself was a surprise; surely when one is
handed such a resounding defeat by two levels of court, the best course
would be to give up – not to press on with an extradition case so desperately
tainted by the unlawful and shocking actions of the very state requesting
extradition. Surely the people of Canada would want its government to stop
such a case in its tracks after these court findings, at the very least so as not
to throw good taxpayer dollars (lawyer time, resources) after bad.
Yet there are cases that make it appear that the Crown is sometimes
willing to pursue extradition at all costs. It is worth recalling that the
landmark Supreme Court of Canada case on abuse of process at the
committal phase, Cobb,171 came about because the Crown insisted on
pressing forward with the extradition of a man who had been threatened by
both the prosecutor and a presiding judge in the requesting state. In a recent
and prominent British Columbia case, the IAG was so eager to keep two
individuals from exercising any more procedural rights that it engaged in
what the Court of Appeal called “subterfuge” in an attempt to rush them
out of the country – which the Court held was an abuse of process that had
“a very serious adverse impact on the integrity of the justice system.”172
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B. Diab : “Lessons Learned”?
The Diab case, one where more detail is known than most, is highly
illustrative of the point I am making here. The Segal Report is replete with
disturbing details, among them:
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174
175

•

At the bail stage, the Crown did not provide an English
translation of the French ROC materials and had to be ordered
to do so, even though Diab was not fluent in French. It also
opposed even the very restrictive bail that was granted and
unsuccessfully challenged this at the Court of Appeal;173

•

For some reason the IAG initially took the position that
translation of the ROC materials was not its responsibility
(though later this stance was “properly abandoned”);174

•

Prior to the committal hearing proper, Diab’s counsel
indicated that he would lead expert evidence that would
destroy the foundation of the French handwriting reports that
formed part of the ROC. It eventually emerged that the reports
had been partly based on handwriting that was not Diab’s, but
the experts nonetheless concluded that it matched the
bomber’s prints. To deal with this development, the advisory
counsel and litigation counsel worked together to warn the
French investigating judge that this would undermine the case
and request that he obtain new handwriting analyses which
could be used. In the meantime, litigation counsel continued
to argue that the flawed handwriting analyses were sufficiently
reliable to ground committal but later changed tack and
submitted the new handwriting analyses when they arrived;175

•

At one point, France realized that they had a sample of what
were thought to be the bomber’s prints and requested that IAG
send Diab’s fingerprints so that they could be compared. The
Crown considered obtaining Diab’s prints surreptitiously but
concluded that his counsel would probably challenge this in

Segal Report, supra note 16 at 40–41.
Ibid at 43.
Ibid at 55–56. This particular stratagem raised concerns the ethical soundness of Mr.
Lefrancois’s conduct, which I will not take up here but which Segal deals with at 95–
103.
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court. Instead, the Crown arranged for France to send copies
of the prints to Canada for comparison with those found in
Diab’s arrest record. Of the six prints found in France, four of
them were conclusively not Diab’s, and two were held to be
inconclusive. Despite the obviously exculpatory nature of this
evidence, IAG counsel decided it was “neither inculpatory nor
exculpatory,” and while they sent the results to France, they did
not disclose this to Diab on the basis that (1) the prints did not
form part of the French case and (2) they did not want to take
a chance of undermining the very restrictive approach taken to
disclosure in the extradition case law;176
•

It was clear that the ROC contained unsourced intelligence,
the unreliability and dangers of which have long been known
(particularly to those who work in inter-state criminal
cooperation).177 The Crown unsuccessfully opposed Diab being
permitted to lead evidence on this point, and it was only after
Professor Kent Roach had testified about it and final arguments
were about to begin that they withdrew reliance on the
unsourced intelligence.178

Hassan Diab, it needs to be recalled, was wrongfully extradited. There
is simply no other sensible conclusion. As regards the role of the Crown,
the Segal Report is interesting because it raises two contradictory
conclusions. The first is the conclusion reached by the report itself: in
conducting the case, the Crown complied with all relevant legal and ethical
norms and principles. This was certainly the view of the Crown officials to
whom Segal spoke in preparing the Report; an internal “Lessons Learned”
exercise ordered by the Minister revealed that IAG personnel found that
“the current Canadian extradition system is fair and working well,” and, if
anything, it needed to be made more efficient.179 Specific to Diab, the only
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problem with his case was that it was unduly protracted, and it was still
entirely proper that he was extradited to France.180
Though perhaps undermined slightly by the fact that Segal consulted
predominantly Crown sources in putting the report together,181 this
conclusion is nonetheless technically defensible – based on the way the
committal phase is structured and the Crown’s view of their own function,
everything is working as it is supposed to. Importantly, Segal’s terms of
reference excluded any consideration of the Extradition Act itself or any
consideration of how things should be. His result, however, underpins the
second conclusion: if the Hassan Diab case can be held up as a model of
how extradition is supposed to work, then Canadians require a serious
inquiry into “how things should be.” This case featured Crown officials
actively collaborating with a foreign state to shore up a case that was weak
from the start, litigating with needless aggression against a Canadian citizen,
withholding exculpatory evidence, and reaching the conclusion that a
wrongful extradition was the correct result. All of this, of course, is in the
context of a government department that dominates all of the decisionmaking, subject to the modest judicial role. Specifically, it assists the
requesting state, litigates on its behalf, makes the decision on whether to
extradite, and fights off appeals and judicial reviews. It seems to me beyond
question that if this is the state of the law then Canadians need to consider
whether this is desirable or whether the system needs to be reformed.

C. Potential Changes
As noted above, this paper can only suggest directions and a few
potential fixes for the problems besetting the Crown’s role in extradition
since what is required is a full-scale judicial inquiry, sustained Parliamentary
attention, or preferably both. That said, a few points offer themselves as
obvious contenders for consideration.
The first is the issue of exculpatory evidence in the hands of the
authorities. As noted earlier, outside the narrow scope of a Charter motion
or the highly-circumscribed process around the sufficiency of the requesting
state’s case, the Crown has minimal duties of disclosure and the requesting
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state is practically immune.182 While it would be useful to explore disclosure
in detail, I would offer, at a minimum, that exculpatory evidence in the
hands of the Crown should be disclosed to the person sought, full stop.
Recognizing that there is no such obligation in the current law, even the
Segal Report recommends that such disclosure could be made, where the
evidence is high-quality, “as a courtesy or discretionary call made in the
circumstances of the particular case.”183 The Halifax Colloquium expressed
the view this disclosure should be mandatory rather than discretionary, and
regardless of whether the evidence was independently gathered by Canadian
officials or disclosed to them. Also, whether the evidence is “exculpatory”
or not should be assessed in compliance with the Stinchcombe criteria that
bind the Crown in criminal cases. This would avoid the kind of mischief
that occurred in Diab, where the Crown decided that fingerprints
predominantly excluding the person sought were somehow “neither
inculpatory nor exculpatory.”
The Segal Report also spoke to the inter-mingling of roles among the
Crown personnel, noting that most typically the litigation is done by a
federal Crown in the relevant province, instructed by IAG counsel who also
acts as a go-between with the requesting state. IAG personnel would also
“advise” the Minister, draft the Minister’s decision, and then either conduct
or instruct on appeals of committal and judicial reviews of surrender. Segal
acknowledged that this might raise the appearance of conflicts of interest,
particularly the direct contact between litigation counsel and the requesting
state, which he viewed as generally inadvisable.184 Expressing his conviction
that all involved “already act in a manner that ensures the requisite
independence at each stage of the extradition proceedings,” he nonetheless
felt that a “formal” separation of roles “would increase transparency and
help to ensure the appearance of independence.”185
The Halifax Colloquium essentially takes Segal’s latter
recommendation as a starting point. There must certainly be litigation
counsel who conduct adversarial litigation in extradition, and one would
really not expect anything different. However, there is something wrong
with a structure where the entire governmental litigation, advisory, and
decision-making machinery are all arrayed against the person sought and
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uniformly driven by the imperative to extradite –especially in a legal process
that, as the Supreme Court reminds us in MM, is supposed to facilitate
comity and protect the rights of the person sought equally.186 A foreign state
is simply not an ordinary client. One way to think about it is to consider
the Attorney General of Canada as representing the requesting state, so
litigation counsel would act in this capacity;187 the Minister of Justice
(despite being the Attorney General’s alter ego in the constitutional sense)
would play the separate and less adversarial role. Accordingly, separation
could be imposed between Attorney General lawyers who litigate on the
requesting states’ behalf and the Minister’s advisory counsel who facilitate
communication with those states. The advisory counsel, in particular,
should be oriented to act in the traditional Crown prosecutor mould of
trying to achieve a just and fair result, rather than simply a “win.”
All of this activity, moreover, should be separate from IAG’s other
function of advising the Minister on whether surrender should be ordered.
These lawyers should not be, as the old saying goes, “in each other’s
pockets.” To underscore that fair treatment is just as important as comity,
the Halifax Colloquium recommended that like other federal agencies such
as the Immigration and Refugee Board, the IAG should adopt an explicit
mandate to the effect that it administers its duties “efficiently, fairly and in
accordance with the law.”188
Finally, the Segal Report recommends that Justice Canada publish
more information about extradition processes generally, including
“statistics about extradition cases” and “the policies and procedures that
guide decision-making by counsel within the IAG.”189 Transparency, Mr.
Segal felt, would help to combat public ignorance and suspicion.190 I would
echo this call but add an additional rationale: more information would
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assist Canadians in understanding the actual policies and practices which
are in place and allow us to ask the tougher questions about whether they
serve adequately to protect persons sought, especially in cases like Diab
where, as the record shows, a wrongful extradition was actively sought and
is not regretted by those who sought it.

VI. CONCLUSION
While attending a criminal law conference some years ago, I struck up
a conversation with a federal litigator whom I knew to have worked on some
extradition cases. When I brought up an interesting issue that had arisen in
a couple of recent cases, the lawyer’s response was to smile and say
(condescendingly, if truth be told), “Ah, academics hate extradition.”
Suffice it to say, this seems like a misplaced opinion. “Academics” and
indeed many other will know that extradition is one of the most important
tools to suppress transnational crime. Given the increasing presence and
intrusiveness of cross-border and even globalized criminal activity, it is
important for Canada to be an effective and enthusiastic participant in
inter-state cooperation efforts. We need an effective extradition system, and
I should not be heard to suggest otherwise.
However, it is equally important that our extradition system be
procedurally fair and sufficiently protective of the rights of individuals
caught up in it, including, but not limited to, Canadian citizens who are
sought by foreign states for prosecution. As this paper has demonstrated,
there are serious problems on both fronts. Hassan Diab’s case, in particular,
powerfully makes the case that significant changes are needed in order to
prevent wrongful extradition. I have argued here that: the committal
process, while it seems consistent with Parliament’s design, is not Chartercompliant and dissatisfactory on a number of fronts; and the role of the
IAG should be re-thought and restructured.
Currently, we are living with the Prime Minister’s apparently broken
promise to usher in change that will prevent a re-occurrence, IAG’s
insistence that there are no problems with the current system, and courts
which are deferential to the status quo. It appears that public attention and
Parliamentary scrutiny are the next logical steps to enact meaningful change,
and it is past time that we had more of both.

